The efficiency properties of price and non-price instruments for conservation in environmental policy are well understood. Yet, there is little evidence comparing the effectiveness of these instruments, especially when considering water resource management. We exploit a rich panel of residential water consumption to examine heterogeneous responses to both price and non-price conservation policies during times of drought while controlling for unobservable household characteristics. Our empirical models suggest that the burden of pricing policies fall disproportionately on low-income households and fail to reduce consumption among households who generally are large consumers of water. However, prescriptive policies such as restrictions on outdoor water use result in uniform responses across income classes while simultaneously targeting reductions from households with irrigation systems or historically high consumption. 
Introduction
Although prescriptive policies are commonly employed by resource managers to encourage conservation, economists tend to advocate for pricing mechanisms to achieve environmental goals since they are typically more efficient.
However, many environmental management contexts involve resources whose prices are regulated by utility commissions or federal oversight. As such, the use of pricing tools to encourage conservation is politically challenging. This is particularly true in the case of water resource management. Efficiency would dictate that price reflects long-run marginal cost of provision, including scarcity rents, which is typically markedly higher than regulated market prices (Mansur and Olmstead, 2012) . As such, non-price strategies, also referred to as prescriptive policies, have become popular demand management tools for water conservation during periods of drought in which the short-run reliability of water resource systems are at risk. These strategies can take the form of restrictions on outdoor water use (Castledine et al., 2014; Renwick and Green, 2000) , information campaigns (Coleman, 1999) , social comparisons (Ferraro and Price, 2013) , or financial incentives for technology adoption (Bennear et al., 2013; Renwick and Archibald, 1998) .
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Despite growing usage of non-price policies in environmental contexts, and a corresponding literature measuring their effectiveness, there is little evidence of the relative merits of pricing versus prescriptive restrictions using household-level panel that allows consideration of both policy types simultaneously, and we have even less evidence about the heterogeneity in responsiveness to these conservation tools across households.
These responses are important to understand because water utilities and policy makers are concerned about the regressive incidence of pricing policies on lower income households.
Further, an important goal of water utilities is to manage the use of households in the upper-tail of the consumption distribution as a means to help reduce water infrastructure over-capitalization. While efficient pricing such as dynamic increasing block rates could address these concerns, as mentioned above they are not generally politically feasible.
In this research, we provide evidence on important observable household characteristics that influence responsiveness to demand-side management policies, while econometrically controlling for unobservable household attributes. Olmstead and Stavins (2009) lay out an exhaustive comparison of price and non-price policies and conclude that neither prices nor prescriptive policies are superior in their distributional bona fides, despite prices being a more cost-effective solution. However, we provide strong empirical evidence that prescriptive conservation policies display more palatable distributional features than price regulation.
Our analysis exploits a rich dataset of water monthly consumption for 1,727
households across six municipalities in North Carolina. The data span a two-and-a-half year period that includes months in which North Carolina was in a severe drought and months in which there were normal conditions. There is variation in drought conditions, price and non-price policies both within the municipalities over time and across municipalities. Further, for each household we observe the household's income, lot-size and whether or not an irrigation system is present. Given the long panel and rich variation in key variables, we are able to identify price and non-price policy responses that reflect month-to-month decisions within a household while controlling for time-invariant unobservable household characteristics that might bias results.
Results indicate that mandatory (voluntary) prescriptive policies focused on outdoor watering restrictions achieve approximately a ten percent (three percent) reduction in aggregate demand. Given the inelastic price responsiveness of households, an average price increase of more than 30% would be required to achieve the same ten percent reduction in water use that the prescriptive mandatory policies achieved. This price increase would imply a 20 percent increase in the average customer's monthly expenditures on water.
Additionally, results from our empirical models suggest that there is important heterogeneity in how households respond to price. Overall, our results suggest that when pricing mechanisms are implemented to affect consumption patterns, the conservation burden falls primarily on lower-income households. The evidence suggests that highincome households are significantly less responsive to price, and households with irrigation systems are found to be completely unresponsive to the price changes that occurred during our sample period. On the other hand, there is a notable lack of heterogeneity among households in their responsiveness to voluntary and mandatory prescriptive policies with the important exception of households with irrigation systems and/or those that are large-volume consumers. Households with irrigation systems and households in the upper 20 th percentile of average consumption in their municipality are found to be almost twice as responsive to mandatory policies than other households.
These results are robust to different model specifications and various definitions of key variables.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we motivate our empirics by highlighting the unique data used in the analysis. The third section presents empirical models of residential water demand that incorporate household heterogeneity explicitly and presents key empirical results and sensitivity analyses. In the final section, we discuss the policy implications of our results and offer concluding remarks.
Data
Thirty consecutive months of household-level billing data are coupled with survey responses for 1,727 households in six municipalities across North Carolina. The data have rich spatial and temporal variation in weather conditions, water rate structures, household water consumption, and demand-side management programs. We describe each of these features below.
Household monthly water use is observed for the period July 2006 through December 2008, which spans two summers with persistent drought conditions and one summer with normal conditions. The six municipalities providing water utility billing data are listed in Table 1 along with summary statistics for the households surveyed in each community.
The municipalities span the three geographic regions of North Carolina and the average weather and growing conditions varies across these municipalities as a result. Chapel Hill. For five of the six municipalities, the median home value for the sample is on average approximately 30% higher than Census reported median home value for the entire municipality. The exception is Chapel Hill in which the median value for our sample of homes is 9% lower than the median home value for all of Chapel Hill.
Mean home square footage is approximately 2,700 square feet across each of our municipalities, and the mean lot size is 0.6 acres, with the exception of Hendersonville, which has an average of 1.1 acre per household. The average household size in the 3 Phone numbers were purchased from InfoUSA, a private vendor since the participating water utilities generally did not maintain phone numbers for their customers. 4 Note, the billing and survey data are drawn from each water utility service area and thus encompasses a broader population than just residents from within the city limits. 5 Due to item non-response, household income data is taken from InfoUSA, the vendor providing household phone numbers. These income data are more disaggregated than survey-reported income.
sample varies from 2.34 to 2.86 individuals per home, while the average for North Carolina during this time period was 2.47 individuals per dwelling unit of any type.
Water Consumption and Pricing
Panel B of Table 1 (Kenny, et al., 2009) . 7 Several municipalities in our study round consumption to the nearest thousand gallons each month for billing purposes. This factor explains the prevalence of 2,000 gallons as the 10 th percentile of consumption for the sample. sewer use, the average and marginal prices for water consumed diverge in all communities, not just those with increasing block rates. Charlotte is consistently higher than the remaining five municipalities who all have similar consumption levels. 8 The two municipalities with flat rates actually had in place a declining rate structure for at least part of the study period. However, the first block was so large (e.g., up to 40,000 gallons per month) that nearly 100% of their customers fell well within the first block. Thus, we treat these two communities as having a flatrate structure. An overall increasing trend in average prices across all municipalities is evident as well.
This increasing trend is driven by changes in rate structures implemented by each utility over the study period. All of the municipalities increased their prices in some way over the study period. In particular, Chapel Hill customers faced a uniform water rate until July 2007, after which an increasing block rate structure was adopted. In addition to adopting an increasing block rate, Chapel Hill also implemented seasonal and droughtinduced surcharges in their rate schedule. 
Drought and Policy Parameters
An integral part of this research is the presence of significant drought conditions throughout North Carolina beginning in the summer of 2007. Table 2 presents a summary index of monthly drought conditions in each municipality throughout the study period, along with an indicator of whether voluntary (V) or mandatory (M) watering restrictions were in place for the majority of that month. An average over of the weekly drought conditions is computed to determine the average status for each month. Weekly drought conditions are described by one of six categories ranging from "normal conditions" (=0) to "exceptional drought" (=5), the most severe category possible. Thus, if in all weeks of a month a municipality is recorded as having "exceptional drought," the index for that month would be 5.0. Average conditions over the month are represented in Table 2 by shades of gray in which the darkest shade with dots indicates a month in which at least half the weeks were categorized as "extreme" or "exceptional drought" and diagonal lines indicate a month in which all weeks were classified as having exceptional drought. No color in Table 2 indicates a month in which the average drought condition across weeks in that month is less than 1.0 (see footnote 1, Table 2 for more details). Table 2 Across municipalities, voluntary restrictions typically took the form of asking customers to limit outdoor lawn and garden watering to 2-3 days a week in a pattern determined by their street address and/or watering only late in the evening or early morning. In addition, customers were also asked to limit other nonessential uses of water such as car washing and home/driveway washing. Mandatory restrictions were generally of the same form as the voluntary restrictions, but in some instances the austerity of the actions were increased, as described below. Table 2 presents the months when voluntary and mandatory restrictions were in place and Table 3 summarizes the restrictions broadly for each municipality. As indicated in Table 2 , all municipalities in our sample employed either voluntary or mandatory restrictions during the study period, while Greenville ( respectively, and kept them in place through the rest of our study period.
As indicated in
we do not directly model this heterogeneity since policies are generally similar the majority of the time. In the few instances that very strict mandatory restrictions were put in place (i.e., a complete ban on outdoor watering), the restriction was exceptionally short-lived or during off-peak seasons where outdoor watering is minimal anyway.
Empirical strategy and results
To identify water consumption responsiveness to price and prescription policies, we develop a panel instrumental variables (IV) model that addresses price endogeneity and incorporates unobserved household heterogeneity through household-specific fixed effects.
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Our baseline specification takes the form:
where the natural log of monthly water consumption (q ikt ) for household i in municipality k in month t is regressed on the instrumented natural log of the average price paid per 1,000 gallons of water in the previous month (AP ikt-1 ), indicator variables for whether or not a voluntary or mandatory water restriction policy was in place during the month (Voluntary kt and Mandatory kt , respectively), a vector of six covariates capturing weather conditions over the month (W kt ), and month and household fixed effects (θ t and α i , respectively). The random error term is given by ε ikt . Since Equation (1) does not account for the upward sloping demand inherent in block pricing, we follow Olmstead 11 All models were also estimated in a random effects framework to exploit cross-sectional variation in the data and check the robustness of results. A series of Hausman tests rejects the hypothesis that the random effects estimator is consistent for all but the simplest specification with a p-value less than 0.01. The consistency of the within-estimator and ability to control for unobserved household characteristics make the fixed effects model the preferred specification. Random effects estimates are available from the authors upon request.
(2009) by instrumenting the natural log of lagged average price by the natural log of marginal prices at arbitrary levels of consumption as follows:
where MP is the marginal price per thousand gallons for the next unit of water consumed for a monthly consumption level at j thousand gallons. We use the instrument set j = {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 15, 20} to capture variation in rate structures among the distribution of consumption, while allowing all municipalities to have the same number of instruments regardless of the number of price tiers observed for a particular municipality at any point in time.
12 Also, base is the base service fee for water and sewer use, and all else is defined as in Equation (1).
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The rationale for these instruments is that they are correlated with the price a household pays since they are representative of the entire rate structure for a particular utility, however the individual household's consumption choice does not affect the utility's rate schedule. Kleibergen-Paap Wald Fstatistics are computed to test the hypothesis that the instruments in the first-stage regression are jointly significant predictors of average price in the presence of withinhousehold error correlation and clustered standard errors, and are all significant at the 1% level (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) .
The first two panels of Table 4 provide definitions and summary statistics for each of the variables included in equations (1) and (2). Average price is the ex post average price calculated by dividing the total billed amount by total consumption. Average rather than marginal prices are used in our main analysis for several reasons. First, it is likely that 12 Models were estimated with several sets of instruments corresponding to different consumption levels and different numbers of marginal prices; coefficient estimates for average price in the second-stage regression are stable across different instrument choices in the first-stage. 13 All models were estimated using the "xtivreg2" routine in Stata 11.2 with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the household level (Schaffer, 2005) .
consumers do not know their precise level of consumption throughout the billing period and, hence, do not know the marginal price being charged at any point in time. Thus it is likely that households respond to their total bill from the previous month when considering altering planned water consumption in the current period, indicating an average price concept is appropriate. This concept is supported by Wichman (2014) and Ito (2014) who both use quasi-experimental research designs and find that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal price when facing tiered rate structures.
From an econometric standpoint, assuming that consumer's respond to their previous bill also allows for the avoidance of contemporaneous correlation with consumption by incorporating lagged average price in the econometric specification (Wichman, 2014) .
Further, average prices exhibit stronger temporal variation than marginal prices in our sample, which improves identification in empirical models that control for unobserved, time-invariant factors at the household level.
14 As indicated in Panel B of Table 4 , voluntary watering restrictions were in place 15%
of the months in our sample and mandatory restrictions were in place 32% of the months.
Weather covariates included in the model (W kt ) include monthly rainfall, mean monthly maximum temperature, a quadratic term for each of these two variables, and an interaction term between monthly rainfall and mean monthly maximum temperature.
These weather variables are included because water usage is driven by current weather conditions while drought conditions (and associated policy instruments) are the result of cumulative weather, storage, and demand patterns. In other words, it is possible to have a reasonably wet month (with little irrigation need), but be in category four or five drought in that month. As such, current weather conditions are important determinants of water use and are not collinear with drought (or policy) status.
Equation (1) estimates the average effect of voluntary and mandatory restrictions across all municipalities. However, as noted earlier, the municipalities differ in the precise mix of policies implemented. As such, we estimate municipality-specific policy effects as follows:
where voluntary and mandatory policies are now interacted with dummy variables for each municipality, Muni k , and all else is as defined for equation (1) 
Household characteristics included in HH ik include income, lot size, the presence of an in-ground irrigation system, and two categorical variables that indicate whether or not a household has historically very high or very low consumption patterns.
Panel C of Table 4 presents the variables included in the vector household characteristics assumed to influence consumption, HH j . Specifically, an indicator variable for whether the household's income was above $75,000 per annum is included along with three categorical variables indicating the lot size (small lots are the category left out of the model) and whether the household has an in-ground irrigation system. In addition, we also include variables that describe each household's average water consumption pattern prior to any prescriptive demand-side management policies restrictions being in place (see Panel C, Table 4 ).
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Specifically, we identify households whose average consumption is in the upper 20% or lower 20% of the distribution for their municipality prior to watering restrictions being enacted. The response of high-volume water users to both price and prescriptive management tools is of particular interest because these households have a higher degree of discretionary water use and are 16 There is no period in our data in which Fayetteville households had not already been exposed to permanent mandatory watering restrictions. For purposes of computing consumptive groups, we treat these households as if they were introduced to non-price policies in August 2007 to be consistent with other municipalities. Note also that Charlotte implemented voluntary restrictions in June 2007, so we restrict the classification of high/low users within this municipality to the period prior to June 2007.
presumably less sensitive to price incentives.
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Managing the demands of high-volume users is thought to be a key component of reducing peak-demands, which is an important goal for water managers who seek to avoid over-capitalization in the delivery system. In this effort, we explore the heterogeneity in response to prices and prescription policies by "consumptive class" by modeling average consumption in the pre-policy period as a time-invariant household characteristic that is incorporated in the vector in equation (4). 
Results
Select coefficients for the models in equations (1), (3) and (4) are presented in Table   5 . Not reported for succinctness are weather covariates or month and household fixed effects.
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The first column in Table 5 presents the results from estimation of equation (1) and suggests an average price elasticity across the entire sample of -0.28, which compares favorably with previous estimates in the literature. Espey et al. (1997) conduct a meta-analysis of water price elasticity estimates from across the U.S., and find an overall mean of -0.51 with a short-run median of -0.38, roughly consistent with our estimates.
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Our results also fall within the range of price elasticities estimated in more 17 Although Ferraro and Price (2013) show that water customers with historical consumption above the mean display a stronger response to a conservation message that appealed to social norms, we have little evidence on the responsiveness of high-volume users to non-price policies outside this specific example. 18 Of course, we recognize that including a function of the dependent variable as a regressor potentially introduces endogeneity into our estimating equation. Thus, we present results for estimation of equation (4) both with and without covariates describing average household consumption prior to prescriptive management tools being in place. We also considered a quantile regression approach (accounting for timeinvariant unobservables and endogenous covariates in the spirit of Harding and Lamarche (2009) ) and the results were largely consistent with the heterogeneity models presented in this paper. See Wichman (2011). 19 Weather covariates had the expected sign and significance in all models. Full results are available from the authors. The first-stage IV regression results (equation 2) are also available from the authors upon request. 20 Dalhuisen et al. (2003) re-examine the Espey et al. findings with a larger set of data and find that 90% of price elasticity estimates fall between 0 and -0.75. recent literature that conditions on seasonal and household heterogeneity (e.g., Baerenklau et al. 2014 , Wichman 2014 , Klaiber et al. 2014 , Mansur and Olmstead 2011 , Nataraj and Hanemann 2011 , Halich and Stephenson 2009 , Olmstead 2009 , and Olmstead et al. 2007 ). These studies report a price elasticity range between -0.12 and -1.93. However, estimates from these recent studies are concentrated within the inelastic range and the modal estimates lie roughly between -0.3 and -0.5, which is similar to our range, albeit slightly higher. Our relatively smaller elasticity estimates can be explained by the fact that we are estimating short-run responses to changes in price within a household, controlling for time-invariant household characteristics. The extent to which estimates from other research are higher may reflect correlation between water use and unobservable household characteristics not included in those models. Thus, research that uses cross-sectional variation in price to identify price elasticities may overstate the average impact of price changes for a given household.
The estimated average response to voluntary and mandatory watering restrictions across the entire sample (Column 1, Table 5 ) was a 3.2% and 9.2% reduction in water consumption, respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. These estimates imply that after controlling for observable weather variables and unobserved time- and Archibald (1998), our relatively smaller estimates capture the effect of variation of policies within a household, which again suggests that unobserved heterogeneity may bias policy estimates away from zero. In addition, there are significant differences in the study areas. It may not be appropriate to compare conservation policies in a humid, but drought-prone area such as North Carolina, to that of arid communities in the Southwest or coastal California.
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Estimation results for the model in equation (3) that incorporates municipal-specific average effects are presented in Table 5 , Column (2) Table 2 ). Thus, the perception (or knowledge) of households 22 In related work, Castledine et al. (2014) exploit daily household-level water consumption in Reno, Nevada and find that day-of-week mandatory watering restrictions result in "rigidity penalties" of 20 to 25 percent of weekly water use. In other words, households choose to irrigate on their assigned days, days regardless of prevailing weather conditions and irrigate suboptimally as a result. Finally, the marginal effect of mandatory policies on water use in Fayetteville (-1.5%) is small and only significant at the 10% level. This is likely due to the fact that Fayetteville had a continuous mandatory policy in place from April 1 st through 23 While we might expect no effect of a voluntary watering restriction in this context, a positive and statistically significant marginal effect is still counterintuitive. Possible reasons for a positive coefficient center on households with irrigation systems. The model indicates no response to the voluntary policy if Charlotte households with irrigation systems are dropped (coef. = 0.004, std. error = 0.017). Households with irrigation systems would appear to increase their usage during the three months the voluntary policy was in place if either moisture sensors on the systems increased irrigation intensity and there was no response by households to offset the automatic system, or households altered their irrigation settings to allow for prolonged periods of watering prior to mandatory restrictions being enacted. Another possibility is that households increased watering intensity in response to the water utility publicizing that mandatory restrictions could be forthcoming if water consumption was not decreased (e.g., Charlotte-Mecklenberg Utility, 2007) . Here again, if households anticipated future mandatory restrictions, they may alter irrigation systems to water more intensely and preserve lawn heath while there was no penalty for violation. is not surprising that there is not a significant reduction in use in months with mandatory restrictions relative to this baseline for this municipality.
Heterogeneity with regards to household characteristics is presented in the last three columns of Table 5 . Column (3) excludes consumptive heterogeneity, while columns (4) and (5) Table 4 for variable definitions). Because of the correlation between having an irrigation system and being in the upper 80 th percentile of consumption, we present a model in column (5) that excludes the dummy variable for irrigation system while including consumption heterogeneity. We also exclude whether or not the household is on a larger lot in column (5), although there is little correlation between lot size and being in the upper 80 th percentile of consumption in the data.
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Results indicate that there is important heterogeneity in the responsiveness of households to prices. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that households in higher income brackets (>$75,000 per year) and households with irrigation systems are substantially less price-elastic. Higher income households display a price elasticity that is one-third the magnitude (in absolute value) than households with income less than $75,000 per year (-0.235 as compared to -0.763, respectively). Relative to the baseline marginal effect, the additional effect of an irrigation system reduces the price elasticity to zero.
The coefficient for the interaction between lot sizes and price presented in Columns (3) and (4) are not statistically significant. Although lot size is often used as a proxy for preference for outdoor water use (Baerenklau et al., 2014, Renwick and Green, 2000; and Mansur and Olmstead, 2012) , our results suggest that irrigation systems and historical consumption patterns capture a more explicit correlation between water use and sensitivity to price.
Finally, columns (4) and (5) Given we only observe prices trending upwards, and if we assume low-use households simply cannot make further substantive reductions in water use, we would expect our models to indicate lower price sensitivity for this group. Similarly, households in the highest consumptive group are almost assuredly using the marginal unit of water in landscapes and other outdoor uses for which more discretion is available for adjusting consumption in response to higher prices.
Interestingly, both Klaiber et al. (2014) and Baerenklau et al. (2014) find an opposite relationship between consumptive levels and price elasticities, both finding that the lowest consumptive levels are the most price sensitive. A potential reason for the divergence in our results is that our price-elasticity identification is based on withinhousehold variation in prices while simultaneously controlling for the effect of household-level income on consumption. Klaiber et al. (2014) Interestingly, we see that during periods when mandatory policies are in place, households with irrigation systems are substantially more responsive than households without irrigation systems, more than doubling the average response to mandatory policies. This finding is notable when compared the degree to which households with irrigation systems were much less responsive to changes in price. With regards to consumptive heterogeneity, households that are in the highest consumptive group (>80 th percentile consumption) reduce their consumption an additional 10 to 11 percent.
Columns (4) and (5) also indicate that households in the lowest consumptive group are less responsive to mandatory policies as compared to households in the middle of the consumption distribution.
Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
To examine the robustness of our results, we first present models that consider alternative definitions of household characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 replace the dummy variable for households with income greater than $75,000 with a series of dummy variables that indicate the income quartile in which the household falls.
The dummy variable indicating that a household is in the lowest quartile {≤$55,000} is the category left out of the model, and the variables Inc Q2, Inc Q3, and Inc Q4 indicate a household is in the second, third, or fourth (top) income quartile-representing the ranges {>$55,000 and ≤ $95,000}, {>$95,000 and ≤ $150,000}, and {>$150,000}, respectively.
All other covariates are exactly the same as for the models presented in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 . Municipal-specific interaction terms with the dummy variables indicating whether or not a voluntary or mandatory policy (Table 5 , Panel B) are not reported in Table 6 for succinctness. Results for these variables are stable and consistent with those reported in Table 5 .
As indicated in the first two columns of Table 6 , all included income quartiles are positive and significant, though the highest quartile exhibits the least degree of price sensitivity. Results also continue to suggest that there is not an economically relevant difference among households with differing incomes in responses to voluntary or mandatory policies, though the second quartile of income is marginally significant for voluntary policies. Although not reported, also estimated are models that replace income quartiles with terciles (the three categories are ≤$65,000; >$65,000 and ≤$112,500;
>$112,500) and these models continue to suggest a similar result: it is the households in the highest brackets of income that are least price responsive, and there is no qualitative difference in response to voluntary or mandatory policies among income groups.
Columns (3) and (4) explore an alternative way to characterize lot-size heterogeneity by creating a dummy variable indicating whether or not a lot is larger than three-quarters of an acre (Lot >3/4 acre). Under this definition, there is no significant heterogeneity in the responsiveness of households on the largest lots (Lot >3/4 acre) to price, indicating that the categorization of what constitutes a large lot does not affect the lack of heterogeneous responses to price. However, the models in columns (3) and (4) now indicate that households on the largest lots are somewhat more responsive to voluntary policies and relatively less responsive to mandatory policies. While the estimated effects are economically small, they are not irrelevant as they suggest that it is only households on very large lots that exhibit policy responsiveness.
Column (5) in Table 6 The magnitude of these effects are larger as compared to the analogous results in Table 5 .
Coefficient estimates also indicate that households in the lowest 10 th percentile of consumption are less responsive to price, not different in their response to voluntary policies, and more responsive to mandatory policies and the magnitude of these results are similar to those in Table 5 . Lastly, we note that narrowing the definition of "high users" to just those households in the top 90 th percentile of consumption results in a price elasticity estimate for households with an irrigation that is positive and statistically significant.
Conclusions
In this research, we employ panel data on household-level water use to explore responses to both pricing and prescriptive policies that are employed by utilities to manage demand in times of scarcity. Monthly water consumption is observed over twoand-a-half years for 1,727 households in six municipalities geographically dispersed across North Carolina. Both voluntary and mandatory water use restrictions are employed at various times by the municipalities in our sample, and water rates vary across municipalities and within municipalities over time. This rich panel data allows us to improve upon the econometric strategies of recent research that uses aggregate data (Renwick and Green, 2000; Klaiber et al., 2014; Halich and Stephenson, 2009) , limited panel data (Olmstead, 2009; Mansur and Olmstead, 2012) , or is unable to explore both pricing and prescriptive policies within the same framework (Nataraj and Hanemann, 2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013; Castledine et al., 2014; . Our policy conclusions are identified by observed short-run, within-household decisions over water use in response to both price changes and prescriptive policies implemented during drought periods, while controlling for unobserved household characteristics in a fixedeffects framework.
Overall, we find that mandatory restrictions are effective demand management tools, reducing household consumption by an average of ten to 13 percent across the municipalities that employ these restrictions on a temporary basis. Voluntary restrictions are observed to be less effective than mandatory restrictions, reducing consumption by approximately three percent, although this result varies across municipalities. We extend our understanding of how households respond to these prescriptive policies by exploring the heterogeneity in household responses to both price and prescriptive policies with respect to income levels, lot sizes, historical consumption levels, and the presence of irrigation systems. Of note are the results concerning household income and responses to both price and prescriptive mechanisms. Our results corroborate the findings of previous research that higher income households are less sensitive to changes in price (e.g., Mansur and Olmstead, 2012; Renwick and Archibald, 1998) . However, we find no evidence of heterogeneous responsiveness to non-price policies among income classes.
Taken as a whole, the results imply that the incidence of pricing policies will fall more heavily on poorer households, while both voluntary and mandatory drought restrictions are relatively equitable across income groups.
Perhaps our most striking result arises from households that have in-ground irrigation systems. We find that households with irrigation systems are virtually unresponsive to changes in price. This result can be explained by the fact that the decision to turn on an automatic irrigation system is made on an extensive margin, and so small fluctuations in price are not likely to affect month-to-month changes in irrigation intensity.
Additionally, we find that households with irrigation systems do not respond to voluntary water restrictions. However, they exhibit more than double the response to mandatory watering restrictions as compared to households without irrigation systems, reducing total consumption by 20 percent or more.
Understanding how "high use" households respond to watering restrictions is also of particular interest. In addition to reducing average use, utilities are interested in reducing use by those in the upper-tail of the distribution to help avoid over-capitalization of the water delivery infrastructure. As theory predicts, water customers with high historical usage tend to be slightly more sensitive to price than the average household, whereas historically low users are less price sensitive. This result mirrors the motivation for the adoption of increasing block rate pricing structures on the merits of maintaining affordability for low use households and incentivizing conservation among high use households. Additionally, high use households are shown to exhibit a response to mandatory restrictions on the same magnitude as households with irrigation systems, decreasing total usage by approximately twenty percent. However, unlike households with irrigation systems, those with the high historic consumption are also more responsive to voluntary policies than more moderate consumption households, reducing consumption by a total of eight percent.
To put responsiveness to prescriptive policies into monetary terms, for comparison, we compute the equivalent price increase necessary to achieve the same reduction in water use for both voluntary and mandatory policies. A voluntary policy that reduced average consumption by three percent within our study reflects a price increase of $1.08
relative to a $10 average price per thousand gallons.
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This increase corresponds to a 7.5 percent increase in the average consumer's monthly bill. For mandatory policies resulting in a nine percent average reduction in quantity consumed, a $3.25 increase in average price per thousand gallons is necessary to achieve the same reduction. This price increase represents a substantial 20.6 percent increase in the average monthly bill, and if applied evenly it would imply a $3.7 million increase in aggregate monthly expenditures on water for the estimated 250,000 residential customers served by the six utilities in our sample.
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While efficient water pricing is preferred on welfare grounds by economists, and the regressive incidence of price policies can largely be addressed through non-uniform increases across consumption blocks (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009 , Mansur and Olmstead. 2011 , and Baerenklau et al. 2014 , price increases of the magnitude suggested above to achieve substantial short-run reductions in water consumption are unrealistic policy choices for most U.S. municipalities. Further, our results imply that price increases are likely to be ineffectual at reducing outdoor irrigation among households 25 The change in price is calculated using the formula: ∆ ⁄ ∆ ⁄ where is the average price in the sample, is the estimated price elasticity, ∆ is the change in quantity demanded induced by the policy, and is the sample average water use (all averages used can be obtained from summary statistics in Table 1 and estimation results from Table 5 , Model 1). 26 There are 374,216 total customer accounts in the municipalities in our study according to 2008 rate summary tables compiled by the Environmental Finance Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (found here: http://www.efc.sog.unc.edu/reslib/item/tables-water-and-wastewater-rates-andrate-structures-north-carolina-january-2008. Last Accessed: July 15, 2014). Assuming, conservatively, that one-third of these accounts are non-residential, we multiply the policy-equivalent increase in customer bills by the assumed number of residential customers (249,477) for both voluntary and mandatory policies. with irrigation systems. As an alternative to prices, mandatory restrictions on outdoor use are shown to be effective conservation tools that achieve uniform responses across income classes while simultaneously achieving significant consumption reductions of approximately twenty percent among households with high historical consumption or with in-ground irrigation systems. Although we do not directly consider the relative efficiency properties of prices and prescriptive policies in this research, our results suggest that non-price policies may have palatable distributional features that align with intended policy goals. This result, combined with political concerns, suggests that carefully constructed mandatory restrictions can be an important component of the policy-maker's tool kit. If efficient pricing of water is to gain public support, it is important for utility managers, policymakers, and researchers to examine and promote pricing structures that balance the competing objectives of incentivizing conservation, maintaining revenue stability, and remaining equitable. and include weather covariates, month and household fixed effects as described for equation (1). Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All models report standard errors that are robust to an unknown form of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the household level.
b Fayetteville is not interacted with the voluntary policy dummy variable because Fayetteville had no voluntary policies during the study period. Similarly, Greenville had no mandatory policies during the study period and is thus not interacted with the mandatory policy dummy variable. Hendersonville is the left out category for both voluntary and mandatory policies. and include and include weather covariates, month and household fixed effects as described for equation (1). Also included, but not reported here for succinctness, are municipal-specific interaction terms with the dummy variables indicating whether or not a voluntary or mandatory policy was in place during the month (these covariates are reported in Table 5 , Panel B and change little across models in Table 5 or 6). Significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All models report standard errors that are robust to an unknown form of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the household level. 
